

Message Text

SECRET

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47

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 038491

O 121212Z AUG 75

FM AMMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5348

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 5462

STADIS////////////////////////////////

EXDIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO AND ATHERTON FROM PICKERING

E.O. 11652 XGDS-1

TAGS/ MASS PFOR JO US

SUBJECT: KING'S STATEMENTS ON HAWKS

REF (A) AMMAN 5438 (B) STATE 189226

1. SUMMARY: AS REPORTED REFTEL (A) SAW KING AUGUST
10. KING IS WILLING TO HAVE A REST PERIOD FOR IMMEDIATE
FUTURE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS. END SUMMARY

2. SAW KING AT PALACE IN EARLY AFTERNOON. BEFOREHAND
AT ROYAL DIWAN MAJOR GENERAL SHAFIQ JUMEAN, JORDAN
MILITARY ATTACHE WHO WAS ALSO WAITING TO SEE KING, JOINED
ME FOR A CONVERSATION. JUMEAN OPENED BY TELLING ME THAT
HE THOUGHT KINGS PRESS STATEMENTS WERE OVERKILLING
SITUATION IN US AND THAT HE HAD COUNSELLED PRIME MINISTER
RIFIA THAT A REST PERIOD WAS NEEDED NOW, AND STATEMENTS
FROM HERE SHOULD CEASE OR BE TONED DOWN. I TOLD HIM
THE SAME PROBLEM WAS ON MY MIND AND THAT I WAS GOING TO
GIVE THE KING THE SAME VIEW WHEN I SAW HIM. JUMEAN
SAID GOOD, HE WAS SURE SOME OF THESE VIEWS HAD ALREADY
GOTTEN TO KING AND THAT OUR REACTION WOULD HELP.

3. WHEN I SAW KING AFTER CONGRATULATING HIM ON ANNIVERSARY
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AUGUST 11 OF HIS ACCESSION TO THE THRONE, I TALKED WITH

HIM GOING AHEAD WITH REDYE AND VULCANS. I THEN MOVED ON TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY QUESTION WHICH RIFAI HAD RAISED WITH ME BY TELEPHONE OF COMMERICAL VS FMS SALES. I TOLD HIM THERE WERE NUMBER OF COMPLEXITIES OF LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY NTURE ON WHICH I HAD ASKED WASHINGTON FOR ADVICE AND WOULD KEEP RIFAI AND HIM INFORMED.

4. I THEN MOVED ON TO DISCUSS WITH HIM SUBJECT OF REFTTEL (B) I TOLD HIM WE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THE TACTICAL SITUATION FOR THE IMMEDIATE PERIOD AHEAD. I REAFFIRMED OUR COMMITMENT TO THE SALE AND SAID THAT WE THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR US BOTH TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER TO THIS END. IT WAS HIS OWN JUDGEMENT OF THE TACTICS THAT WOULD BE IMPORTANT AND WE ALSO HAD SOME IDEAS OF OUR OWN. I THEN PROCEEDED TO SAY THAT WE SAW TWO POSSIBLE WAYS OF PROCEEDING. (A) THE FIRST WAS TO CONTINUE AS WE HAD UP UNTIL NOW WITH A RATHER HEAVY PUBLIC CAMPAIGN. THIS HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON AND LEAVING NO ONE IN DOUBT ABOUT WHAT THE POSITION WAS. BUT IT HAS A DISADVANTAGE ALSO. SOME OF OUR FRIENDS IN CONGRESS HAD IT CLEAR TO US THAT TOO MUCH MORE OF THE SAME RAN A RISK OF MAKING THE CONGRESS THINK THEY WERE BEING PRESSURED AND GIVEN ULTIMATUMS. WE HAD TRIED TO WALK A FINE LINE WITH CONGRESS BETWEEN GIVING THEM A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A BLOCKAGE OF THE SALE ON THE ONE HAND AND PRESENTING THEM WITH AN ULTIMATUM ON THE OTHER.IT HAD WORKED WELL THUS FAR. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE :(B) WAS TO GO IN FOR A QUIET PERIOD IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, CERTAINLY UNTIL THE CONGRESS CAME BACK IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. THIS AVOIDED THE CONSEQUENCES OF APPEARING TO PROVIDE TOO MUCH PRESSURE, AND FURTHER WOULD NOT PERMIT THOSE OPPOSED TO THE SALE TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT PRESSURE WAS BEING APPLIED ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POSSIBLE DANGER WAS THAT SOME MIGHT NOT KNOW OF THE DEEP FEELING AND VALID REASONS IN JORDAN AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ABOUT THE NEED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE SALE. HOWEVER THE KING'S REMARKS TO THE PRESS LAST WEEK HAD LEFT NO ONE IN DOUBT ABOUT THE POSITION HERE.

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4. THEN I SAID THAT WE NOW FAVORED THE SECOND OPTION WE WERE AFRAID IF TOO MANY MORE STATEMENTS WEREMADE FROM HERE IT WOULD LOOK LIKE A PRESSURE EFFORT AND WOULD UNDERMINE THE KING'S UNIQUE AND VERY FAVORABLE IMAGE IN THE US WITH THE PUBLIC CONGRESS. AND IN THE LONG RUN THAT WAS ONE OF OUR GREATEST ASSETS IN ATTEMPTING TO SECURE A FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD

THE SALE. IN PARTICULAR OPPONENTS OF THE SALE
COULD BEGIN TO TURN STATEMENTS ABOUT GROWING TIES
WITH SYRIA AND TURNING TO THE SOVIETS AGAINST US
TO HARM OUR COMMON INTERESTS.

5. KING SAID HE AGREED AND THAT POINTS WHICH I
MADE HAD MADE SENSE TO HIM. ALL HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT
NOW WAS THAT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE IF HE HAD TO
TURN TO THE SOVIETS PEOPLE WOULD NOT TURN ON HIM
AND SAY "WHY DID YOU DO THAT" ? IN REPLY I TOLD
HIM THAT I THOUGHT HIS POSITION WAS NOW CRYSTAL
CLEAR. WE HAD TOLD THE CONGRESS ABOUT THE ALTERNATIVES TO US
SALE AND HE HAD MADE
THE PUBLIC RECORD UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR
IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. (I DID NOT THINK IT WOULD DO
OUR CASE WITH HIM OR HIS OWN MORALE ANY GOOD JUST NOW TO
TELL HIM HE HAD PROBABLY ALREADY BEGUN THE PROCESS
OF PRODUCING A NEGATIVE REACTION IN CONGRESS.)

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O 121212Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5349

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 5462

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

EXDIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY SISCO AND ATHERTON FROM PICKERING

6. KING THEN SAID HE AGREED, HE HAD NOTHING SCHEDULED
WITH THE PRESS EXCEPT WITH DE BORCHGRAVE OF NEWSWEEK
IN THE FUTURE ANYWAY. I TOLD HIM THAT HIS RELATIONSHIP
WITH DE BORCHGRAVE IS GOOD ENOUGH TO ENSURE THAT
NOTHING FURTHER GETS DONE AND THAT I WAS SURE
DE BORCHGRAVE WOULD GIVE HIM THE SAME PUBLIC RELATIONS

ADVICE AS I WAS IN ANY EVENT.

7. BEFORE LEAVING I REAFFIRMED WITH HIM THAT I WOULD BE TELLING WASHINGTON HE WAS NOW GOING TO GIVE THE WHOLE ISSUE A REST FOR THE IMMEDIATE PERIOD AHEAD AND HE AGREED WITH THIS LINE.

8. HE WILL BE TIED UP HERE WITH ECHEVERRIA UNTIL THE 13TH AND WILL GO TO SYRIA FOR SEVERAL DAYS (17TH TO 20TH) AFTER THAT (AUG 23RD) NORTH YEMEN'S HAMDI ARRIVES FOR A FEW DAYS, AND ON THE 30TH HE GOES TO CAIRO FOR A FEW DAYS. IN ADDITION PRINCE FAHD ARRIVES HERE AUGUST 12 FOR A FEW DAYS. THAT TOO WILL HELP TO LIMIT HIS AND RIFAI'S PRESS EXPOSURE.

9. SAW RIFAI BRIEFLY AT THE AIRPORT AND WE WILL GO TOGETHER LATER. I ALSO SAW MINISTERS OF INFORMATION AND GAVE HIM THE GIST OF MY CONCERNS
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AND HE AGREED FULLY THAT THE TIME HAD NOW COME TO SHUT UP. HE CAN BE HELPFUL ALSO BECAUSE HIS IDEAS ON PUBLIC RELATIONS CARRY SOME WEIGHT WITH KING AND RIFAI.

10. KING TALKED BRIEFLY ABOUT HIS VISIT TO IRAN AND OMAN. NOT MUCH THERE THAT WAS NOT COVERED WITH RIFAI EARLIER. HE DID SAY THAT JORDAN HAD OFFERED OMAN AN INFANTRY COMPANY IN PLACE OF THE SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION WHICH IS COMING OUT AFTER MONSOON STARTS IN LATE SEPTEMBER. THUS FAR THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE COMPANY WOULD BE MADE UP OF RECENT RETIREES AND WOULD AVOID ANY DRAIN ON HIS PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT. HE ALSO SAID SHAH WOULD BE SENDING MORE TROOPS TO OMAN FOR A FALL OFFENSIVE AND THAT SHAH (AS WE KNOW) WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE JORDAN TURKISH ARMS AID AND SALES PROBLEMS.

1. BEFORE I LEFT HE SAID WITH A TWINKLE IN HIS EYE THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN AFTER HIM TWICE IN RECENT WEEKS TO SEE IF HE COULD HELP AND TO EXPRESS PLEASURE AT KING'S RECENT STATEMENTS ABOUT AMERICAN HAWK SALE. KING SAID TO SOVIETS IN BOTH INSTANCES, OR SO HE TOLD ME "DON'T CALL US WE'LL CALL YOU". KING ALSO ASKED ME ABOUT FRANCO-GERMAN ROLAND. HE SAID SYRIA WAS GOING TO BUY SOME AND MAYBE HE WOULD TOO. I TOLD THE KING THAT THERE WERE PROBABLY OTHER OPTIONS HE WOULD WANT TO WORK AT IF GOD FORBID, THIS SALE DID NOT WORK OUT, BUT THAT THERE WOULD BE A TIME AND PLACE FOR THAT KING OF A DISCUSSION IF THINGS DID NOT GO THE WAY HE AND WE WANTED. BUT IN THE MEANTIME

WE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE HIM THE IMPRESSION WE WERE
SHIFTING OUR GROUND ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE SALE.
HE SAID YES THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME FOR THAT
AND IN THE INTERIM HE WOULD BE KEEPING HIS EYES OPEN
AND DOING SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

12. COMMENT: HE WAS MORE READY THAN I SUSPECTED TO
COME ALONG WITH US ON SHUT DOWN OF PUBLIC ACTIVITIES
FOR TIME BEING AND I THINK WE HAVE AVOIDED WOUNDING
HIS PRIDE WHICH MIGHT HAVE ONE UNFORTUNATE RESULT OF THE
APPROACH. ALSO IT IS CLEAR FROM A NUMBER OF

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PERSONNEL COMMENTS THAT HE AND RIFIA HAVE MADE
TO METHAT THEY
ARE REALLY NOT HAPPY WITH THE DILEMMA OF GOING EITHER TO THE
US OR SOVIETS BUT SEE NO CLEAR WAY OUT OF THE
ALL OR NOTHING EFFORT THEY ARE MAKING THAT WILL NOT RESULT
IN A SERIOUS LOSS OF FACE FOR THEM. ANOTHER OBVIOUS
GOOD RESULT IN A OF GETTING THEM TO STAY QUIET PUBLICLY
IS THAT IT MAY IN THE LONG RUN HELP TO REDUCE THE
DEGREE TO WHICH THEY HAVE PAINTED THEMSELVES INTO
A CORNER. END COMMENT.
PICKERING

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